{"id":61,"date":"2025-09-02T20:45:17","date_gmt":"2025-09-02T20:45:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/?p=61"},"modified":"2025-09-09T19:11:26","modified_gmt":"2025-09-09T19:11:26","slug":"revised-aircraft-accident-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/?p=61","title":{"rendered":"20250413 – Revised Aircraft Accident Report"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t

20250413 - Revised Aircraft Accident Report (Complete)<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tClick to Download the Entire Report<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON: <\/b><\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT <\/strong>(COMPLETE)<\/strong>

<\/h2>

CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON:<\/strong>

<\/p>

(1) THE A-7D\u2019s AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AFCS);<\/strong><\/h4>

(2) THE A-7D SN 72-0233\u2019s RED X STATUS and APPARENT LONG-TERM INOPERABLE<\/strong><\/h4>

CONDITON;<\/strong><\/h4>

(3) THE MOST RECENT MAJOR MAINTENACE ISSUES ON A-7D SN 72-0233,<\/strong><\/h4>

INCLUDING, INTER ALIA:

<\/strong><\/h4>

(a) AN UNREPAIRED RADAR ALTIMETER WITH SIGNIFCANT INACCURATE<\/strong><\/p>

ALTITUDE READINGS WHEN THE SPEED BRAKE WAS EXTENDED<\/strong><\/p>

(Pilot was informed the Radar Altimeter\/Speed Brake issue was repaired);

<\/strong><\/p>

(b) UNREPAIRED MALFUNCTIONING FORWARD LOOKING RADAR; AND

<\/strong><\/p>

(c) AN INOPERABLE, UNREPARED FIRE WARNING LIGHT; OR

<\/strong><\/p>

(4) ANY DISCUSSION in the original investgaton report that MAJOR MONAHAN\u2019S <\/strong>FLIGHT PLAN REQUIRED:<\/strong><\/h4>


(a) FLYING USING ONLY INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR);<\/strong><\/p>


(b) FLYING AT HIGH SPEED;<\/strong><\/p>


(c) DESCENDING from MEDIUM to LOW ALTITUDE WHILE TRANSITIONING
<\/strong>from HIGH SPEED to LOW SPEED OVER WATER JUST BEFORE REACHING THE TARGET SHIP; and<\/p>

(d) DOING ALL of the Above WHERE the OTHER SORTIE PILOTS EACH DISCUSSED THAT MORNING on HOW EVERYTHING BELOW 1000\u2019 AGL was\u201cA VISUAL ILLUSION\u201d \u2013 The WATER WAS \u201cLIKE A MIRROR\u201d as the SUN ROSE THAT MORNING.

<\/h4>

MAJOR WILLIAM J. MONAHAN<\/h4>

Virginia AIR NATIONAL GUARD, Richmond IAD, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/h4>

TIME of IMPACT: February 09, 1982, Between 0929 and 0933<\/h4>

CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON THE A-7D\u2019s<\/h4>

AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AFCS)

<\/h4>

On the morning of 9 February 9 1982, a flight of three 192d TFG A-7Ds left Byrd International Airport, Richmond, Virginia, and proceeded to the Dare County, North Carolina,

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 2

<\/p>

Navy Bombing Range located on Pamlico Sound, adjacent to the Outer Banks. The flight\u2019s<\/p>

mission was to conduct an air-to-ground sortie at RS313. Stumpy Point Gunnery Range.

<\/p>

As relevant background, the prior Summer of 1981, the 192d TFG had just received the<\/p>

A7-Ds from another unit (Previously, the 192d TFG \/ 149th TFS pilots flew F-105Ds). On or<\/p>

about August 10, 1981, the 192d TFG placed Major William J. Monahan\u2019s A-7D (SN 72-0233)<\/p>

in Red-X status, where a significant number of unrelated, significant service repairs were<\/p>

required. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-1 to H-2. On 19 December 1981, SN 72-0233 was<\/p>

released from Red X status upon acceptance of its inspection. On that same day, a Functional<\/p>

Check Flight (FCF) was conducted, which FCF demonstrated that SN 72-0233 was not flight<\/p>

worthy. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. The FCF revealed multiple, significant malfunctions<\/p>

and\/or failures of the Automatic Flight Control system (AFCS) occurred on the FCF, and SN<\/p>

72-0233 was grounded until at least 4 February 1982, five days prior to the 9 February 1982<\/p>

sortie. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2 to H-3. As a final note: The prior F-105Ds did not have<\/p>

an AFCS, which was new to the 192d TFG\/149th TFS, including to the 192d Material<\/p>

Squadron Maintenance Technicians.

<\/p>

Captain Herbert T. Arnold, was the lead in the three-aircraft sortie, and was taking a<\/p>

Tactical Qualification Flight Check. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5. Major William C.<\/p>

Jones was Captain Arnold\u2019s flight examiner. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2. As a key part of the<\/p>

flight check, Captain Arnold prepared and briefed the flight plan for the mission, which was an<\/p>

early morning, low altitude employment over water. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2 , U-5; see<\/p>

also Exh. 05, Tab K-3 and Tab K-4. Captain Arnold\u2019s flight plan set Instrument Flight Rules<\/p>

(IFR) for the mission. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3 to K-4 and Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5, and U-<\/p>

7. In this flight plan, Captain Arnold was Fury 11, and, along with Major Jones (Fury 12),<\/p>

were scheduled to fly the Navy Dare 2 Plan, which was a low altitude flight to the target ship<\/p>

to be bombed on Pamlico Sound, Navy Dare Range, North Carolina. Major Monahan (Fury<\/p>

13) was to fly at medium altitude, where upon approaching within several miles of the target<\/p>

ship, would descend to low altitude over the water, make a dry run clearing pass to ensure the<\/p>

target ship was devoid of civilians, notify Fury 11 and 12 that the ship was clear, and then \u201cact<\/p>

as an adversary during the ingress of Fury 11\u201d, who, at low altitude over the water, would<\/p>

\u201cmake the first attack hot.\u201d Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2. Low altitude rules of engagement<\/p>

(ROE) were discussed during the briefing due to the inherently dangerous proximity of the<\/p>

aircraft to the water and the level of precision required to avoid potential for surface collision.<\/p>

Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5, and U-7. As the flight plan was an IFR mission, all pilots<\/p>

were to rely only upon their flight instruments until cancelled to enable visual clearance of the<\/p>

target and adversarial maneuvering. As of this day, Major Monahan had more than 3,700 flight<\/p>

hours, 62 of which were in the A-7D and K models. Please see Exh. 02, Tab G-2.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 3

<\/p>

The A-7D flown by these pilots was equipped with an Automatic Flight Control System<\/p>

(AFCS). Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 1-2. The cockpit window dashboard for this<\/p>

AFCS was the Head-Up Display (HUD), where altitude, provided by the radar altimeter, was<\/p>

displayed on the right side of the HUD. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 1-2. The<\/p>

purpose of a HUD is like the name says: to provide the pilot with all relevant flight readings,<\/p>

like altitude, so that the pilot may keep their \u201chead up\u201d \u2013 instead of looking down at instrument<\/p>

panels. For flying under 5,000 feet altitude, the A-7D Flight Manual advised pilots to use the<\/p>

HUD radar altimeter, noting that the radar altimeter in this altitude range was \u201chighly accurate<\/p>

[] within plus or minus 5 feet or 5 percent of absolute altitude, whichever is greater.\u201d Please<\/p>

see Exh. 09, A7-D Flight Manual at pgs. 4 and 5.

<\/p>

The A-7D AFCS was equipped with Forward Looking Radar (FLR), which emits radio<\/p>

waves, similar to the radar altimeter. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 5. While the radar<\/p>

altimeter measures altitude, the FLR \u201cscans the terrain ahead of the aircraft for obstacles or<\/p>

features.\u201d Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 5. Low altitude missions in low to no<\/p>

visibility rely heavily on systems like the FLR to ensure the aircraft doesn\u2019t inadvertently fly<\/p>

into the terrain. Without accurate ranging, the risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)<\/p>

significantly increases. This makes the aircraft unsafe for these types of operations.\u201d Please<\/p>

see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 7. A \u201cfully operational FLR is critical for [low altitude]<\/p>

operations\u201d, so much so, that the aircraft should be grounded or restricted from IFR low-<\/p>

altitude missions when the FLR is malfunctioning. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 7. A<\/p>

malfunctioning FLR becomes far more dangerous where the radar altimeter is also inaccurate.<\/p>

And this danger is multiplied further where the flight is utilizing IFR where visibility is poor<\/p>

and\/or deceptive. This is because the radar altimeter is the flight instrument providing the<\/p>

altitude readings to the FLR, which then displays simulated terrain in front of the aircraft to the<\/p>

pilot via the HUD. Please see Exh. 09, A7-D Flight Manual at pg. 4.

<\/p>

\u201cThe AFCS and radar altimeter [] played a[n important] role in terrain[\/water]<\/p>

avoidance during low-level flights. If [][an accurately operating] radar altimeter detected that<\/p>

the aircraft was descending too close to the terrain[\/water], [][an] AFCS [with a properly<\/p>

functioning FLR] would automatically adjust the aircraft\u2019s pitch or thrust to avoid collision, or<\/p>

at least alert the pilot through warning systems.\u201d Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 2.

<\/p>

Additionally, the A-7D had a single hydraulic system, which controlled the flight<\/p>

controls (e.g., ailerons, elevators, rudder, and other control surfaces) as well as the speed<\/p>

brakes. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 10. A \u201csignificant vulnerability\u201d of the A-7D\u2019s<\/p>

single hydraulic system was that a single failure of any part of the hydraulic system could lead<\/p>


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 4

<\/p>

to a catastrophic failure of the entire AFCS for the A-7D. pg. 12.<\/p>

Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg.12.

<\/p>

There is nothing in the Aircraft Accident Report to indicate that prior to the February 9,<\/p>

1982 departure of Fury 11-13, Captain Arnold, Major Jones, or anyone at the Unit reviewed<\/p>

aircraft maintenance records to ensure that all three aircraft were free from prior issues,<\/p>

recurrent, significant maintenance history, or unresolved maintenance that might warrant<\/p>

grounding an aircraft from participating in the dangerous, high-risk mission of a low altitude<\/p>

mission over water \u2013 especially under time of day and conditions where it is not uncommon for<\/p>

the water and horizon to appear as one: a visual illusion day. Please see generally, Aircraft<\/p>

Accident Report. Nor is there anything in the Aircraft Accident Report to indicate that AFCS<\/p>

systems and supporting devices, like the radar altimeter, FLR systems, Fire Warning Light, or<\/p>

AMF Light were cleared as operational and safe under conditions that would be applied on a<\/p>

high-speed descent to low altitude over water like Fury 13 would be performing. Please see<\/p>

generally, Aircraft Accident Report. This is particularly concerning as Fury 13 would be<\/p>

completely dependent upon the AFCS as IFR rules were in effect via the Flight Plan on a low<\/p>

altitude mission, in visual illusion conditions, where precision navigation was critical as<\/p>

controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) in such situation was a very real safety concern. Please<\/p>

see ChatGPT4 at pg. 7.

<\/p>

The departure of 0913 was three minutes later than planned to stay on schedule \u201cfor the<\/p>

assigned [time on target] TOT of 0935.\u201d Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-5; Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and<\/p>

U-5. To remain on schedule, all three pilots had to exceed the flight plan cruising speed of 440<\/p>

nautical miles per hour or knots (KTs) by roughly 12%: That is, at an approximate rate of 493<\/p>

KTs. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3; see also Exh. 05, Tab K-5; Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5. Fury<\/p>

13 flew at a medium altitude per the flight plan. See Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5; see also Exh.<\/p>

07, Tab U-3. At 0929, Fury 11 and Fury 12 were \u201ceast bound just North of Navy Dare Range<\/p>

and just West of Pamlico Sound\u201d (Exh. 07, Tab U-2) \u201cabout two minutes from the turn point\u201d<\/p>

(Exh. 07, Tab U-5), when \u201cCaptain Arnold in Fury 11 asked Fury 13 if the target was clear.\u201d<\/p>

Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5. \u201cFury 13 said he was \u2018not there yet\u2019\u201d. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2<\/p>

and U-5. From Fury 11\u2019s request to Fury 13, it appears that Fury 13 had not made up the lost<\/p>

three minutes as quickly as Fury 11 and Fury 12, and may have been slightly behind the TOT<\/p>

0935 at that point.

<\/p>

Between 0929 and 0933, approximately three-plus miles NNE of the target ship, Fury<\/p>

13 began to descend from a medium altitude to below 1000\u2019 AGL until reaching low altitude<\/p>

immediately over the water to conduct his low-altitude over water clearing pass. Please see<\/p>

Exh. 04, Tab J-2 to J-3; Exh. 07, Tab U5. Captain Arnold\u2019s Flight Plan required Fury 13 to be

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 5

<\/p>

at low altitude to engage Fury 11 on Fury 11\u2019s low altitude bombing run and by acting \u201cas an<\/p>

adversary during the ingress for Fury 11\u201d and following \u201clow-altitude ROE\u201d Please see Exh.<\/p>

07, Tab U-2. The speed brake is an effective tool for a smooth, controlled deceleration on<\/p>

descent and before \u201ctransitioning to a low altitude environment [] where precise control is<\/p>

crucial.\u201d Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 13. \u201cOverall, the speed brake provides the pilot<\/p>

with a means of fine-tuning the descent and ensuring the aircraft’s speed, attitude, and<\/p>

trajectory are optimal for a safe, controlled, and effective transition to low-altitude cruise or<\/p>

terrain-following flight.\u201d Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 14. Any effect of the speed brake<\/p>

on the radar altimeter\u2019s accuracy, and therefore on the FLR and AFCS, could lead to a failure<\/p>

of situational awareness by the pilot.

<\/p>

At 0933, Fury 11 unsuccessfully attempted contact with Fury 13 and proceeded towards<\/p>

the target. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-5. On approach to the target ship, Fury 11 remarked on<\/p>

the radio that \u201cthe water surface [on Pamlico Sound] was perfectly smooth [] \u2018a visual illusion<\/p>

day\u2019\u201d. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-3. Fury 11 noted that \u201c[b[elow 1000\u2019 [above ground level]<\/p>

AGL, there was not a horizon and depth perception was difficult. [] A great day for visual<\/p>

illusion.\u201d Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-6.

<\/p>

Pursuant to FAA rules and consistent with the IFR Flight Plan, the FAA advises pilots to<\/p>

\u201chave confidence in your instruments and ignore all conflicting signals\u201d when these pilots<\/p>

encounter visual illusion conditions like those approaching the impact site and observed and<\/p>

remarked upon by Fury 11. Please see Exh. 10, FAA Guidance on Visual Illusion at p.4.<\/p>

Technical Order (TO) 1A-7D-1, the USAF A-7D Flight Manual (A-7D Flight Manual),<\/p>

directed pilots as follows: \u201cMaximum use of the AFCS is recommended during instrument<\/p>

flight.\u201d Please see Exh. 09, A-7D Flight Manual at pg. 7.

<\/p>

After Fury 13 did not respond to repeated calls from Fury 11, Fury 11 and 12 continued<\/p>

a dry run of the attack with negative clearance from Fury 13 on the target. Please see Exh. 07,<\/p>

Tab U-6. Two and one-half to three miles from the target at a 37-degree heading, Fury 11<\/p>

noticed what appeared to be a sandbar looking area. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-6. After<\/p>

conducting three observations passes over the impact area, Fury 11 felt that Fury 13 had hit the<\/p>

water. Fury 11 initiated a safety and rescue (SAR) effort, but there was no survivor from the<\/p>

crash into the waters of Pamlico Sound. Please see Exh. 01, Tab A-1. The crash response<\/p>

team found no evidence of an ejection. Please see Exh. 01, Tab A-1.

<\/p>

The widely spread impact site area establishes that Fury 13 did not impact the water in<\/p>

a nosedown position and\/or hit the water at an apparent angle. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R.<\/p>

This is evidenced by the wreckage debris area being spread approximately 1,500 feet apart \u2013<\/p>

the distance of five football fields. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. It is significant to this

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 6

<\/p>

observation that the bottom-nose of the A-7D is not much more than a very large air-dam.<\/p>

Please see A-7D at pgs. 2-3.

<\/p>

After first bumping off the water\u2019s surface and leaving \u201cassorted scraps\u201d of wreckage, it<\/p>

was another 750 feet before any other aircraft parts were found: the Project Map Display<\/p>

System (PMDS) Tape. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. The PMDS Tape stored flight data, such as<\/p>

altitude and airspeed, and was located in the avionics bay, on the bottom of the aircraft behind<\/p>

the front landing gear on the A-7D. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 17; see also Exh. 09,<\/p>

A-7D Flight Manual at 3. Based on the wreckage locations to the initial impact area and the<\/p>

target, after the initial bump on the water, the A-7D entered an adverse yaw left, which general<\/p>

direction continued until final impact as demonstrated by the location of the remaining<\/p>

wreckage. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. About 75\u2019 further, it appears the adverse yaw left<\/p>

resulted in a full, uncontrolled roll of the aircraft, which left behind the Upper Horizontal Tail<\/p>

(UHT) and Tail section of the aircraft. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. Approximately 900\u2019+ after<\/p>

initial minimal impact with the water, the engine, located in the rear fuselage of the A-7D, was<\/p>

found. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R; see also Exh. 09, A-7D Flight Manual at pg. 3 (diagram<\/p>

displaying the engine location). Only after travelling above the water\u2019s surface for<\/p>

approximately 1,000\u2019 after initial minimal impact, the nose, cockpit, and bulk of the aircraft<\/p>

impacted, leaving a 10\u2019 x 8\u2019 depression. Please see Tab R. The main landing gear were<\/p>

adjacent to this primary impact site and engine accessories and the tailpipe were strewn up to<\/p>

500 feet further from the primary point of impact. Please see Tab 4R.

<\/p>

Operating pursuant to an IFR flight plan, Fury 13 failed to safely descend from medium<\/p>

altitude, through 1000\u2019 AGL where the horizon was indistinguishable from the mirror-like<\/p>

water. Fury 13, however, almost did so, leveling out of the descent and travelling for up to<\/p>

1000\u2019 to 1500\u2019 along the water\u2019s surface before fully impacting. And Major Barry\u2019s report<\/p>

finding that the pitch actuator(s) was\/were in a \u201cneutral position\u201d, indicates that Major<\/p>

Monahan believed that he was finishing a controlled, normal level-off from a high-speed<\/p>

descent \u2013 there was no panic attempt to pull up. Please see Exh. 06, Tab A-002. This is prima<\/p>

facie evidence that faulty instrument readings that Major Monahan had to rely upon in the<\/p>

prevailing visual conditions were responsible for the crash.<\/p>


Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 781s document the maintenance, repairs and<\/p>

inspections performed on a particular aircraft. The AFTO 781 for SN 72-0233, compiled from<\/p>

the Aircraft Historical Record File and the MMICS Computer Products (as the 781 forms<\/p>

binder was reported as destroyed with the aircraft in the crash) shows the following major<\/p>

maintenance issues with Fury 13\u2019s A-7D in the 180+ days prior to its last mission on February<\/p>

9, 1982:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 7

<\/p>

\u2022 From August 10 through December 17, 1981, the aircraft was in Red X status after<\/p>

being received by the 192d TFG in non-flight-worthy condition.

<\/p>

o During the Red X period a significant number of major maintenance actions were taken on the aircraft, including for example:<\/p>


o 16 Nov 81, Trailing Edge Flaps Inoperable. Corrective action: Replaced Circuit<\/p>

Card;<\/p>


o 18 Nov 81, rudder servo leaking. Corrective Action: \u201cremoved and replaced<\/p>

rudder servo\u201d.<\/p>

Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-1 to H-2.<\/p>


Note1:<\/strong> The rudder servo was a critical part of the rudder control system on the A-<\/p>

7D, to help the pilot control yaw. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 18.

<\/p>

\u2022 17 Dec 81, the maintenance inspector performed an Aircraft Acceptance Inspection,<\/p>

and found SN 72-0233 to be ready for flight and free of from major maintenance<\/p>

issues. The Unit removed SN 72-0233 from Red X status. Please see Exh. 03, Tab<\/p>

H-2.

<\/p>

\u2022 19 Dec 81, a single Functional Check Flight (FCF) was performed to verify the<\/p>

functionality of all systems. The aircraft was released from the FCF the same day.<\/p>

The following major maintenance issues were identified during that flight,<\/p>

including:

<\/p>

o AFCS \u201cACCEL\u201d YAW actuator does not move to left as it should. Corrective<\/p>

Action: 24 Dec 81, performed balance and ops check IAW 1A-7D-2-9.<\/p>

o AFCS to Center ball in flight, need one unit right rudder. Corrective Action: 6<\/p>

Jan 82, performed balance and ops ck IAW 1A-7D-2-9.<\/p>


o When the speed brake is estended (sic), radar altimeter lock on to approximately<\/p>

30 degrees. Corrective Action: 6 Jan 82, removed and replaced RT-1046 ops<\/p>

check good IAW 1A-7D-2-12.

<\/p>

\uf0a7 The angle of the radar altimeter should not have been affected by the<\/p>

speed brake, but the accuracy of the radar altimeter could be adversely<\/p>

affected by a power surge and\/or electromagnetic interference (EMI)<\/p>

arising from application of the speed brake and\/or damage to internal<\/p>

circuits. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4, at pg. 21. In any event, there is

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 8

<\/p>

nothing in the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT to indicate that the<\/p>

speed brake and\/or radar altimeter correlation was ever flight checked.

<\/p>

o Radar altimeter read approximately 250 degrees low-RA 4160 (RT-1046%)<\/p>

BARO 4476. Corrective Action: 6 Jan 82, removed and replaced RT-1046, ops<\/p>

check good IAW 1A-7D-2-12.

<\/p>

\uf0a7 The angle of the radar altimeter should not have been affected by the<\/p>

speed brake, but the accuracy of the radar altimeter could be adversely<\/p>

affected by a power surge and\/or electromagnetic interference (EMI)<\/p>

arising from application of the speed brake and\/or damage to internal<\/p>

circuits. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4, at pg. 21. In any event, there is<\/p>

nothing in the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT to indicate that the<\/p>

speed brake and\/or radar altimeter correlation was ever flight checked.

<\/p>

o FLR in priority, no FLR ranging at release (VIS Attack or CCIP). Corrective<\/p>

Action: Write up left open due to Unit\u2019s lack of test equipment.<\/p>

Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2 to H-3; see also Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 6, 8-9.<\/p>


\uf0a7 No ranging by the FLR in any mode could have serious effect on<\/p>

instrument readings for orientation during level-off over water.<\/p>

\u2022 21 Dec 81, the rudder servo was leaking again. Corrective Action: \u201cremoved and<\/p>

replaced rudder servo.\u201d Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2.

<\/p>

\u2022 22 Dec 81, rudder servo valve leaking beyond limits. Corrective Action: \u201cremoved<\/p>

and replaced rudder servo.\u201d Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2.<\/p>

\u2022 4 Feb 82, first flight.<\/p>

o Fire Warning Light INOPerable. No record and recollection that the Fire<\/p>

Warning Light INOP was ever repaired or addressed. The last record available \u2013<\/p>

five days before the aircraft\u2019s final flight – indicates that the Fire Warning Light<\/p>

was inoperable.<\/p>

Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-3.<\/p>


\u2022 5 Feb 82 and 6 Feb 82. First flight, no discrepancies. Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-3.<\/p>


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 9

<\/p>

As demonstrated above and below, there were serious, unresolved issues regarding the<\/p>

maintenance performed on critical aircraft systems by the Unit. The Unit\u2019s failure to ground<\/p>

SN 72-0233 and place it back into Red X status is clear. On 9 February 1982, the Unit cleared<\/p>

this aircraft for an IFR medium to low altitude engagement. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2.<\/p>

SN 72-0233 had never flown a single mission at the 192d TFG. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H.<\/p>

On 19 December 1981, the day the 192d Material Squadron (Maintenance) inspected SN 72-<\/p>

0233, it cleared it from Red-X Status. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. That same day, SN 72-<\/p>

0233 failed its FCF, because the FCF revealed significant repairs that were required regarding<\/p>

multiple flight systems on the reliability of which the AFCS was dependent for safe,<\/p>

operational flight. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. SN 72-0233 was only cleared for its first<\/p>

post-FCF test flight five days prior to being approved by the 192d Material Squadron<\/p>

(Maintenance) to fly an IFR mission on a visual illusion day with a high-speed flight plan,<\/p>

requiring a high-speed descent from medium altitude to low altitude. See generally, Exh. 003,<\/p>

Tab H-3. Unsurprisingly, the above performance and related decisions resulted in Major<\/p>

Monahan\u2019s death. In particular, there are several key issues that are illustrative:

<\/p>

1. Instead of addressing why the radar altimeter readings read as if the AN 72-0233<\/p>

was locked onto 30 degrees off center when the speed brake was extended \u2013 and<\/p>

read as if it was also 250 degrees off otherwise \u2013 the Maintenance Officer simply<\/p>

replaced part RT-1046.<\/p>


Observation: Unfortunately for Fury 13, inter alia, RT-1046 was an Ultra-High<\/p>

Frequency (UHF) Radio Transceiver; NOT the Radar Altimeter. See ChatGPT<\/p>

pgs. 1-4. Accordingly, Fury 13 was sent on a dangerous high-speed, medium<\/p>

altitude to low-level altitude engagement in circumstances where the use of the<\/p>

speed brake was expected – with a malfunctioning radar altimeter that, upon<\/p>

engaging the speed brake, displayed false altitude to the pilot on the cockpit<\/p>

HUD (Nor were any diagnostics run to try to identify why the speed brake was<\/p>

adversely interfering with a completely unrelated AFCS system, the readings of<\/p>

the Radar Altimeter). The IFR flight plan, A-7D Flight Manual, and the FAA<\/p>

IFR rules for visual illusion days directed use of the radar altimeter as displayed<\/p>

on the right of the cockpit HUD. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3; Exh. 09, A-7D<\/p>

Flight Manual at page 7 (directing maximum use of the AFCS system, where, in<\/p>

this instance, the radar altimeter and FLR were the primary AFCS systems); and<\/p>

Exh. 10, FAA Visual Illusion Directive at page 4;

<\/p>

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 10

<\/p>

2. 3. When it was identified that the FLR in priority was not functioning properly, the<\/p>

Maintenance Officer simply decided to leave the FLR in a malfunctioning state and<\/p>

clear the aircraft for flight: because the Unit did not have the proper test<\/p>

equipment.<\/p>


Observation: The FLR system is crucial for safe flight in low-altitude<\/p>

environments, particularly in low visibility conditions, and its malfunction under<\/p>

such circumstances significantly increases the risk of CFIT \u2013 which is precisely<\/p>

what happened to Fury 13 on February 9, 1982 at or about 0933. Please see Exh.<\/p>

08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 5-7;<\/p>

and When the Fire Warning Light was identified four days prior to flight as<\/p>

INOPERABLE, no known action was ever taken and the aircraft was sent on its<\/p>

February 9, 1982 low altitude engagement mission with no way of detecting an<\/p>

electrical fire (e.g., when the speed brake was extended and an electrical situation<\/p>

occurred that was significant enough to cause the radar altimeter to malfunction).<\/p>

Observation: \u201cAccording to FAA regulations (14 CFR Part 91) and military<\/p>

airworthiness standards, all safety-critical systems, including fire warning<\/p>

systems, must be fully operational for an aircraft to be considered airworthy. If a<\/p>

fire warning light is inoperable, it could be considered a deficiency that<\/p>

compromises the aircraft’s airworthiness.\u201d Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg.<\/p>

19. \u201cWithout a functioning fire warning system, an A-7D Corsair II would not be<\/p>

considered airworthy due to the significant safety risks involved. The fire<\/p>

warning system is essential for the pilot\u2019s safety, and any inoperable critical<\/p>

warning system would require repair before the aircraft is cleared for flight.\u201d<\/p>

Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 19.<\/p>


Based on all of the facts contained in the record, SN 72-0233 should have been<\/p>

grounded in Red X status pending major maintenance diagnostics and accurate repairs and<\/p>

adjustments that ensured that critical systems like the radar altimeter, the FLR, the Fire<\/p>

Warning Light, and repeated, uncorrected hydraulics issues were properly diagnosed,<\/p>

identified, and corrected.1 Under no circumstances was this aircraft remotely fit for a low-<\/p>

1 A strong argument could be made that the 192d TFG Material Squadron Maintenance Technician<\/p>

working on SN 72-0233, in replacing the rudder servo \u2013 three (3) times \u2013 because the \u201crudder servo<\/p>

was leaking\u201d [even after the rudder servo\u2019s multiple, new part replacements], and never running<\/p>

through a troubleshooting checklist (e.g., are the hydraulic lines dry damaged; is there too much

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT<\/p>

Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)<\/p>

Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS<\/p>

Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan<\/p>

Page 11

<\/p>

altitude, IFR engagement in visual illusion conditions. The fact that the AFCS did not<\/p>

autocorrect to avoid the impact with the water \u2013 as the AFCS is supposed to do when fed<\/p>

accurate radar altimeter readings – only reinforces this conclusion.

<\/p>

Bottom Line: This crash was not pilot error.<\/strong>

<\/h5>

Very respectfully,<\/p>

William J. Monahan<\/p>

GA Bar No. 801028

<\/p>

__________
pressure in the hydraulic line system; etc.) \u2013 at best \u2013 demonstrated a lack of methodical action in<\/p>

practice as it relates to his\/her maintenance of SN 72-0233. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2 to H-3. If<\/p>

flight and\/or maintenance records for SN 72-0233 revealed that prior to August 1981, SN 72-0233 had<\/p>

not been flown for a significant period of time, the inside of the hydraulic lines and\/or seals in<\/p>

hydraulic line related equipment may well have been dry rotted, weakened, or worse.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tClick to Download the Entire Report<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

20250413 – Revised Aircraft Accident Report (Complete) Click to Download the Entire Report CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT (COMPLETE) CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON: (1) THE A-7D\u2019s AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AFCS); (2) THE A-7D SN 72-0233\u2019s RED X STATUS and APPARENT LONG-TERM INOPERABLE CONDITON; (3) THE MOST RECENT MAJOR MAINTENACE […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=61"}],"version-history":[{"count":44,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":373,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61\/revisions\/373"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=61"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=61"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/correcttheinjustice.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=61"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}