CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON:
CONTAINING ORIGINALLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION ON:
(a) AN UNREPAIRED RADAR ALTIMETER WITH SIGNIFCANT INACCURATE
ALTITUDE READINGS WHEN THE SPEED BRAKE WAS EXTENDED
(Pilot was informed the Radar Altimeter/Speed Brake issue was repaired);
(b) UNREPAIRED MALFUNCTIONING FORWARD LOOKING RADAR; AND
(c) AN INOPERABLE, UNREPARED FIRE WARNING LIGHT; OR
(a) FLYING USING ONLY INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR);
(b) FLYING AT HIGH SPEED;
(c) DESCENDING from MEDIUM to LOW ALTITUDE WHILE TRANSITIONING
from HIGH SPEED to LOW SPEED OVER WATER JUST BEFORE REACHING THE TARGET SHIP; and
On the morning of 9 February 9 1982, a flight of three 192d TFG A-7Ds left Byrd International Airport, Richmond, Virginia, and proceeded to the Dare County, North Carolina,
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 2
Navy Bombing Range located on Pamlico Sound, adjacent to the Outer Banks. The flight’s
mission was to conduct an air-to-ground sortie at RS313. Stumpy Point Gunnery Range.
As relevant background, the prior Summer of 1981, the 192d TFG had just received the
A7-Ds from another unit (Previously, the 192d TFG / 149th TFS pilots flew F-105Ds). On or
about August 10, 1981, the 192d TFG placed Major William J. Monahan’s A-7D (SN 72-0233)
in Red-X status, where a significant number of unrelated, significant service repairs were
required. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-1 to H-2. On 19 December 1981, SN 72-0233 was
released from Red X status upon acceptance of its inspection. On that same day, a Functional
Check Flight (FCF) was conducted, which FCF demonstrated that SN 72-0233 was not flight
worthy. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. The FCF revealed multiple, significant malfunctions
and/or failures of the Automatic Flight Control system (AFCS) occurred on the FCF, and SN
72-0233 was grounded until at least 4 February 1982, five days prior to the 9 February 1982
sortie. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2 to H-3. As a final note: The prior F-105Ds did not have
an AFCS, which was new to the 192d TFG/149th TFS, including to the 192d Material
Squadron Maintenance Technicians.
Captain Herbert T. Arnold, was the lead in the three-aircraft sortie, and was taking a
Tactical Qualification Flight Check. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5. Major William C.
Jones was Captain Arnold’s flight examiner. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2. As a key part of the
flight check, Captain Arnold prepared and briefed the flight plan for the mission, which was an
early morning, low altitude employment over water. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2 , U-5; see
also Exh. 05, Tab K-3 and Tab K-4. Captain Arnold’s flight plan set Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) for the mission. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3 to K-4 and Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5, and U-
7. In this flight plan, Captain Arnold was Fury 11, and, along with Major Jones (Fury 12),
were scheduled to fly the Navy Dare 2 Plan, which was a low altitude flight to the target ship
to be bombed on Pamlico Sound, Navy Dare Range, North Carolina. Major Monahan (Fury
13) was to fly at medium altitude, where upon approaching within several miles of the target
ship, would descend to low altitude over the water, make a dry run clearing pass to ensure the
target ship was devoid of civilians, notify Fury 11 and 12 that the ship was clear, and then “act
as an adversary during the ingress of Fury 11”, who, at low altitude over the water, would
“make the first attack hot.” Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2. Low altitude rules of engagement
(ROE) were discussed during the briefing due to the inherently dangerous proximity of the
aircraft to the water and the level of precision required to avoid potential for surface collision.
Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2, U-5, and U-7. As the flight plan was an IFR mission, all pilots
were to rely only upon their flight instruments until cancelled to enable visual clearance of the
target and adversarial maneuvering. As of this day, Major Monahan had more than 3,700 flight
hours, 62 of which were in the A-7D and K models. Please see Exh. 02, Tab G-2.
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 3
The A-7D flown by these pilots was equipped with an Automatic Flight Control System
(AFCS). Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 1-2. The cockpit window dashboard for this
AFCS was the Head-Up Display (HUD), where altitude, provided by the radar altimeter, was
displayed on the right side of the HUD. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 1-2. The
purpose of a HUD is like the name says: to provide the pilot with all relevant flight readings,
like altitude, so that the pilot may keep their “head up” – instead of looking down at instrument
panels. For flying under 5,000 feet altitude, the A-7D Flight Manual advised pilots to use the
HUD radar altimeter, noting that the radar altimeter in this altitude range was “highly accurate
[] within plus or minus 5 feet or 5 percent of absolute altitude, whichever is greater.” Please
see Exh. 09, A7-D Flight Manual at pgs. 4 and 5.
The A-7D AFCS was equipped with Forward Looking Radar (FLR), which emits radio
waves, similar to the radar altimeter. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 5. While the radar
altimeter measures altitude, the FLR “scans the terrain ahead of the aircraft for obstacles or
features.” Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 5. Low altitude missions in low to no
visibility rely heavily on systems like the FLR to ensure the aircraft doesn’t inadvertently fly
into the terrain. Without accurate ranging, the risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
significantly increases. This makes the aircraft unsafe for these types of operations.” Please
see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 7. A “fully operational FLR is critical for [low altitude]
operations”, so much so, that the aircraft should be grounded or restricted from IFR low-
altitude missions when the FLR is malfunctioning. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 7. A
malfunctioning FLR becomes far more dangerous where the radar altimeter is also inaccurate.
And this danger is multiplied further where the flight is utilizing IFR where visibility is poor
and/or deceptive. This is because the radar altimeter is the flight instrument providing the
altitude readings to the FLR, which then displays simulated terrain in front of the aircraft to the
pilot via the HUD. Please see Exh. 09, A7-D Flight Manual at pg. 4.
“The AFCS and radar altimeter [] played a[n important] role in terrain[/water]
avoidance during low-level flights. If [][an accurately operating] radar altimeter detected that
the aircraft was descending too close to the terrain[/water], [][an] AFCS [with a properly
functioning FLR] would automatically adjust the aircraft’s pitch or thrust to avoid collision, or
at least alert the pilot through warning systems.” Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 2.
Additionally, the A-7D had a single hydraulic system, which controlled the flight
controls (e.g., ailerons, elevators, rudder, and other control surfaces) as well as the speed
brakes. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 10. A “significant vulnerability” of the A-7D’s
single hydraulic system was that a single failure of any part of the hydraulic system could lead
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 4
to a catastrophic failure of the entire AFCS for the A-7D. pg. 12.
Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg.12.
There is nothing in the Aircraft Accident Report to indicate that prior to the February 9,
1982 departure of Fury 11-13, Captain Arnold, Major Jones, or anyone at the Unit reviewed
aircraft maintenance records to ensure that all three aircraft were free from prior issues,
recurrent, significant maintenance history, or unresolved maintenance that might warrant
grounding an aircraft from participating in the dangerous, high-risk mission of a low altitude
mission over water – especially under time of day and conditions where it is not uncommon for
the water and horizon to appear as one: a visual illusion day. Please see generally, Aircraft
Accident Report. Nor is there anything in the Aircraft Accident Report to indicate that AFCS
systems and supporting devices, like the radar altimeter, FLR systems, Fire Warning Light, or
AMF Light were cleared as operational and safe under conditions that would be applied on a
high-speed descent to low altitude over water like Fury 13 would be performing. Please see
generally, Aircraft Accident Report. This is particularly concerning as Fury 13 would be
completely dependent upon the AFCS as IFR rules were in effect via the Flight Plan on a low
altitude mission, in visual illusion conditions, where precision navigation was critical as
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) in such situation was a very real safety concern. Please
see ChatGPT4 at pg. 7.
The departure of 0913 was three minutes later than planned to stay on schedule “for the
assigned [time on target] TOT of 0935.” Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-5; Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and
U-5. To remain on schedule, all three pilots had to exceed the flight plan cruising speed of 440
nautical miles per hour or knots (KTs) by roughly 12%: That is, at an approximate rate of 493
KTs. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3; see also Exh. 05, Tab K-5; Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5. Fury
13 flew at a medium altitude per the flight plan. See Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5; see also Exh.
07, Tab U-3. At 0929, Fury 11 and Fury 12 were “east bound just North of Navy Dare Range
and just West of Pamlico Sound” (Exh. 07, Tab U-2) “about two minutes from the turn point”
(Exh. 07, Tab U-5), when “Captain Arnold in Fury 11 asked Fury 13 if the target was clear.”
Exh. 07, Tab U-2 and U-5. “Fury 13 said he was ‘not there yet’”. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-2
and U-5. From Fury 11’s request to Fury 13, it appears that Fury 13 had not made up the lost
three minutes as quickly as Fury 11 and Fury 12, and may have been slightly behind the TOT
0935 at that point.
Between 0929 and 0933, approximately three-plus miles NNE of the target ship, Fury
13 began to descend from a medium altitude to below 1000’ AGL until reaching low altitude
immediately over the water to conduct his low-altitude over water clearing pass. Please see
Exh. 04, Tab J-2 to J-3; Exh. 07, Tab U5. Captain Arnold’s Flight Plan required Fury 13 to be
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 5
at low altitude to engage Fury 11 on Fury 11’s low altitude bombing run and by acting “as an
adversary during the ingress for Fury 11” and following “low-altitude ROE” Please see Exh.
07, Tab U-2. The speed brake is an effective tool for a smooth, controlled deceleration on
descent and before “transitioning to a low altitude environment [] where precise control is
crucial.” Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 13. “Overall, the speed brake provides the pilot
with a means of fine-tuning the descent and ensuring the aircraft’s speed, attitude, and
trajectory are optimal for a safe, controlled, and effective transition to low-altitude cruise or
terrain-following flight.” Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at 14. Any effect of the speed brake
on the radar altimeter’s accuracy, and therefore on the FLR and AFCS, could lead to a failure
of situational awareness by the pilot.
At 0933, Fury 11 unsuccessfully attempted contact with Fury 13 and proceeded towards
the target. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-5. On approach to the target ship, Fury 11 remarked on
the radio that “the water surface [on Pamlico Sound] was perfectly smooth [] ‘a visual illusion
day’”. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-3. Fury 11 noted that “[b[elow 1000’ [above ground level]
AGL, there was not a horizon and depth perception was difficult. [] A great day for visual
illusion.” Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-6.
Pursuant to FAA rules and consistent with the IFR Flight Plan, the FAA advises pilots to
“have confidence in your instruments and ignore all conflicting signals” when these pilots
encounter visual illusion conditions like those approaching the impact site and observed and
remarked upon by Fury 11. Please see Exh. 10, FAA Guidance on Visual Illusion at p.4.
Technical Order (TO) 1A-7D-1, the USAF A-7D Flight Manual (A-7D Flight Manual),
directed pilots as follows: “Maximum use of the AFCS is recommended during instrument
flight.” Please see Exh. 09, A-7D Flight Manual at pg. 7.
After Fury 13 did not respond to repeated calls from Fury 11, Fury 11 and 12 continued
a dry run of the attack with negative clearance from Fury 13 on the target. Please see Exh. 07,
Tab U-6. Two and one-half to three miles from the target at a 37-degree heading, Fury 11
noticed what appeared to be a sandbar looking area. Please see Exh. 07, Tab U-6. After
conducting three observations passes over the impact area, Fury 11 felt that Fury 13 had hit the
water. Fury 11 initiated a safety and rescue (SAR) effort, but there was no survivor from the
crash into the waters of Pamlico Sound. Please see Exh. 01, Tab A-1. The crash response
team found no evidence of an ejection. Please see Exh. 01, Tab A-1.
The widely spread impact site area establishes that Fury 13 did not impact the water in
a nosedown position and/or hit the water at an apparent angle. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R.
This is evidenced by the wreckage debris area being spread approximately 1,500 feet apart –
the distance of five football fields. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. It is significant to this
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 6
observation that the bottom-nose of the A-7D is not much more than a very large air-dam.
Please see A-7D at pgs. 2-3.
After first bumping off the water’s surface and leaving “assorted scraps” of wreckage, it
was another 750 feet before any other aircraft parts were found: the Project Map Display
System (PMDS) Tape. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. The PMDS Tape stored flight data, such as
altitude and airspeed, and was located in the avionics bay, on the bottom of the aircraft behind
the front landing gear on the A-7D. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 17; see also Exh. 09,
A-7D Flight Manual at 3. Based on the wreckage locations to the initial impact area and the
target, after the initial bump on the water, the A-7D entered an adverse yaw left, which general
direction continued until final impact as demonstrated by the location of the remaining
wreckage. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. About 75’ further, it appears the adverse yaw left
resulted in a full, uncontrolled roll of the aircraft, which left behind the Upper Horizontal Tail
(UHT) and Tail section of the aircraft. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R. Approximately 900’+ after
initial minimal impact with the water, the engine, located in the rear fuselage of the A-7D, was
found. Please see Exh. 06, Tab R; see also Exh. 09, A-7D Flight Manual at pg. 3 (diagram
displaying the engine location). Only after travelling above the water’s surface for
approximately 1,000’ after initial minimal impact, the nose, cockpit, and bulk of the aircraft
impacted, leaving a 10’ x 8’ depression. Please see Tab R. The main landing gear were
adjacent to this primary impact site and engine accessories and the tailpipe were strewn up to
500 feet further from the primary point of impact. Please see Tab 4R.
Operating pursuant to an IFR flight plan, Fury 13 failed to safely descend from medium
altitude, through 1000’ AGL where the horizon was indistinguishable from the mirror-like
water. Fury 13, however, almost did so, leveling out of the descent and travelling for up to
1000’ to 1500’ along the water’s surface before fully impacting. And Major Barry’s report
finding that the pitch actuator(s) was/were in a “neutral position”, indicates that Major
Monahan believed that he was finishing a controlled, normal level-off from a high-speed
descent – there was no panic attempt to pull up. Please see Exh. 06, Tab A-002. This is prima
facie evidence that faulty instrument readings that Major Monahan had to rely upon in the
prevailing visual conditions were responsible for the crash.
Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 781s document the maintenance, repairs and
inspections performed on a particular aircraft. The AFTO 781 for SN 72-0233, compiled from
the Aircraft Historical Record File and the MMICS Computer Products (as the 781 forms
binder was reported as destroyed with the aircraft in the crash) shows the following major
maintenance issues with Fury 13’s A-7D in the 180+ days prior to its last mission on February
9, 1982:
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 7
• From August 10 through December 17, 1981, the aircraft was in Red X status after
being received by the 192d TFG in non-flight-worthy condition.
o During the Red X period a significant number of major maintenance actions were taken on the aircraft, including for example:
o 16 Nov 81, Trailing Edge Flaps Inoperable. Corrective action: Replaced Circuit
Card;
o 18 Nov 81, rudder servo leaking. Corrective Action: “removed and replaced
rudder servo”.
Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-1 to H-2.
Note1: The rudder servo was a critical part of the rudder control system on the A-
7D, to help the pilot control yaw. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 18.
• 17 Dec 81, the maintenance inspector performed an Aircraft Acceptance Inspection,
and found SN 72-0233 to be ready for flight and free of from major maintenance
issues. The Unit removed SN 72-0233 from Red X status. Please see Exh. 03, Tab
H-2.
• 19 Dec 81, a single Functional Check Flight (FCF) was performed to verify the
functionality of all systems. The aircraft was released from the FCF the same day.
The following major maintenance issues were identified during that flight,
including:
o AFCS “ACCEL” YAW actuator does not move to left as it should. Corrective
Action: 24 Dec 81, performed balance and ops check IAW 1A-7D-2-9.
o AFCS to Center ball in flight, need one unit right rudder. Corrective Action: 6
Jan 82, performed balance and ops ck IAW 1A-7D-2-9.
o When the speed brake is estended (sic), radar altimeter lock on to approximately
30 degrees. Corrective Action: 6 Jan 82, removed and replaced RT-1046 ops
check good IAW 1A-7D-2-12.
The angle of the radar altimeter should not have been affected by the
speed brake, but the accuracy of the radar altimeter could be adversely
affected by a power surge and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI)
arising from application of the speed brake and/or damage to internal
circuits. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4, at pg. 21. In any event, there is
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 8
nothing in the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT to indicate that the
speed brake and/or radar altimeter correlation was ever flight checked.
o Radar altimeter read approximately 250 degrees low-RA 4160 (RT-1046%)
BARO 4476. Corrective Action: 6 Jan 82, removed and replaced RT-1046, ops
check good IAW 1A-7D-2-12.
The angle of the radar altimeter should not have been affected by the
speed brake, but the accuracy of the radar altimeter could be adversely
affected by a power surge and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI)
arising from application of the speed brake and/or damage to internal
circuits. Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4, at pg. 21. In any event, there is
nothing in the AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT to indicate that the
speed brake and/or radar altimeter correlation was ever flight checked.
o FLR in priority, no FLR ranging at release (VIS Attack or CCIP). Corrective
Action: Write up left open due to Unit’s lack of test equipment.
Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2 to H-3; see also Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 6, 8-9.
No ranging by the FLR in any mode could have serious effect on
instrument readings for orientation during level-off over water.
• 21 Dec 81, the rudder servo was leaking again. Corrective Action: “removed and
replaced rudder servo.” Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2.
• 22 Dec 81, rudder servo valve leaking beyond limits. Corrective Action: “removed
and replaced rudder servo.” Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-2.
• 4 Feb 82, first flight.
o Fire Warning Light INOPerable. No record and recollection that the Fire
Warning Light INOP was ever repaired or addressed. The last record available –
five days before the aircraft’s final flight – indicates that the Fire Warning Light
was inoperable.
Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-3.
• 5 Feb 82 and 6 Feb 82. First flight, no discrepancies. Please see Exh. 03, Tab H-3.
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 9
As demonstrated above and below, there were serious, unresolved issues regarding the
maintenance performed on critical aircraft systems by the Unit. The Unit’s failure to ground
SN 72-0233 and place it back into Red X status is clear. On 9 February 1982, the Unit cleared
this aircraft for an IFR medium to low altitude engagement. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2.
SN 72-0233 had never flown a single mission at the 192d TFG. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H.
On 19 December 1981, the day the 192d Material Squadron (Maintenance) inspected SN 72-
0233, it cleared it from Red-X Status. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. That same day, SN 72-
0233 failed its FCF, because the FCF revealed significant repairs that were required regarding
multiple flight systems on the reliability of which the AFCS was dependent for safe,
operational flight. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2. SN 72-0233 was only cleared for its first
post-FCF test flight five days prior to being approved by the 192d Material Squadron
(Maintenance) to fly an IFR mission on a visual illusion day with a high-speed flight plan,
requiring a high-speed descent from medium altitude to low altitude. See generally, Exh. 003,
Tab H-3. Unsurprisingly, the above performance and related decisions resulted in Major
Monahan’s death. In particular, there are several key issues that are illustrative:
1. Instead of addressing why the radar altimeter readings read as if the AN 72-0233
was locked onto 30 degrees off center when the speed brake was extended – and
read as if it was also 250 degrees off otherwise – the Maintenance Officer simply
replaced part RT-1046.
Observation: Unfortunately for Fury 13, inter alia, RT-1046 was an Ultra-High
Frequency (UHF) Radio Transceiver; NOT the Radar Altimeter. See ChatGPT
pgs. 1-4. Accordingly, Fury 13 was sent on a dangerous high-speed, medium
altitude to low-level altitude engagement in circumstances where the use of the
speed brake was expected – with a malfunctioning radar altimeter that, upon
engaging the speed brake, displayed false altitude to the pilot on the cockpit
HUD (Nor were any diagnostics run to try to identify why the speed brake was
adversely interfering with a completely unrelated AFCS system, the readings of
the Radar Altimeter). The IFR flight plan, A-7D Flight Manual, and the FAA
IFR rules for visual illusion days directed use of the radar altimeter as displayed
on the right of the cockpit HUD. Please see Exh. 05, Tab K-3; Exh. 09, A-7D
Flight Manual at page 7 (directing maximum use of the AFCS system, where, in
this instance, the radar altimeter and FLR were the primary AFCS systems); and
Exh. 10, FAA Visual Illusion Directive at page 4;
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 10
2. 3. When it was identified that the FLR in priority was not functioning properly, the
Maintenance Officer simply decided to leave the FLR in a malfunctioning state and
clear the aircraft for flight: because the Unit did not have the proper test
equipment.
Observation: The FLR system is crucial for safe flight in low-altitude
environments, particularly in low visibility conditions, and its malfunction under
such circumstances significantly increases the risk of CFIT – which is precisely
what happened to Fury 13 on February 9, 1982 at or about 0933. Please see Exh.
08, Chat GPT4 at pgs. 5-7;
and When the Fire Warning Light was identified four days prior to flight as
INOPERABLE, no known action was ever taken and the aircraft was sent on its
February 9, 1982 low altitude engagement mission with no way of detecting an
electrical fire (e.g., when the speed brake was extended and an electrical situation
occurred that was significant enough to cause the radar altimeter to malfunction).
Observation: “According to FAA regulations (14 CFR Part 91) and military
airworthiness standards, all safety-critical systems, including fire warning
systems, must be fully operational for an aircraft to be considered airworthy. If a
fire warning light is inoperable, it could be considered a deficiency that
compromises the aircraft’s airworthiness.” Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg.
19. “Without a functioning fire warning system, an A-7D Corsair II would not be
considered airworthy due to the significant safety risks involved. The fire
warning system is essential for the pilot’s safety, and any inoperable critical
warning system would require repair before the aircraft is cleared for flight.”
Please see Exh. 08, Chat GPT4 at pg. 19.
Based on all of the facts contained in the record, SN 72-0233 should have been
grounded in Red X status pending major maintenance diagnostics and accurate repairs and
adjustments that ensured that critical systems like the radar altimeter, the FLR, the Fire
Warning Light, and repeated, uncorrected hydraulics issues were properly diagnosed,
identified, and corrected.1 Under no circumstances was this aircraft remotely fit for a low-
1 A strong argument could be made that the 192d TFG Material Squadron Maintenance Technician
working on SN 72-0233, in replacing the rudder servo – three (3) times – because the “rudder servo
was leaking” [even after the rudder servo’s multiple, new part replacements], and never running
through a troubleshooting checklist (e.g., are the hydraulic lines dry damaged; is there too much
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Re: 9 February 1982 Flight of A7-D, SN 72-0233 (Fatal)
Virginia Air Natonal Guard, 192d TFG, 149 TFS
Pilot: Major William Jay Monahan
Page 11
altitude, IFR engagement in visual illusion conditions. The fact that the AFCS did not
autocorrect to avoid the impact with the water – as the AFCS is supposed to do when fed
accurate radar altimeter readings – only reinforces this conclusion.
Very respectfully,
William J. Monahan
GA Bar No. 801028
__________
pressure in the hydraulic line system; etc.) – at best – demonstrated a lack of methodical action in
practice as it relates to his/her maintenance of SN 72-0233. Please see Exh. 003, Tab H-2 to H-3. If
flight and/or maintenance records for SN 72-0233 revealed that prior to August 1981, SN 72-0233 had
not been flown for a significant period of time, the inside of the hydraulic lines and/or seals in
hydraulic line related equipment may well have been dry rotted, weakened, or worse.